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NatioNal seCUrity strategy of UkraiNe:  
history of belateD reforms
Among the scientific issues facing the Ukrainian legal community at the present stage, problems in the 
field of national security law is of particular relevance and practical importance. It is caused, first of all, by 
the need for systematic reform of the security and defense sector of Ukraine, which is aimed at ensuring the 
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the constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine in the conditions of armed aggression. Of 
course, researches in that sphere should not be limited by certain subject directions in the development and 
resolution of complex problems in particular of national security law. Since independence, there has been 
no systematic assessment of direct or indirect influence of the national security doctrine on legal regulation 
of the security sphere in Ukraine. As a result of ignoring the issue on identifying potential opponents 
of Ukraine and threats caused by them, government, while making security policy, was largely driven by 
subjective considerations, ignoring existing and potential threats to national security. As a result, it was 
impossible to properly assess the consequences of political decisions taken in the field of national security. 
The article studies the origin, content and political significance of national security doctrine for the 
formation of relevant legislation in the field of security and defense of Ukraine.
Keywords: national security; strategy; paradigm; national interests; threaten; challenges; 
aggression; Russian-Ukrainian conflict; Ukraine.
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Стратегія національної безпеки України: історія запізнілих реформ
Серед наукових питань, що постають перед українською юридичною спільнотою на сучас-
ному етапі, особливо актуальними і практично значимими є проблеми у сфері права національ-
ної безпеки. Це обумовлено насамперед необхідністю системного реформування сектору безпеки 
і оборони України, яке здійснюється задля забезпечення захисту конституційного ладу, сувере-
нітету, територіальної цілісності України в умовах збройної агресії. Звісно, дослідження в цій 
сфері не повинні обмежуватись окремими предметними напрямами в розробленні та вирішенні 
комплексних проблем, зокрема права національної безпеки. З моменту здобуття незалежності 
систематичне оцінювання прямого чи опосередкованого впливу доктрини національної безпеки 
на правове регулювання сфери безпеки в Україні не проводилося. В наслідок ігнорування питання 
щодо визначення потенційних противників України і загроз, які від них походять, влада при 
виробленні безпекової політики керувалася здебільшого суб’єктивними чинниками, ігноруючи 
існуючі і потенційні виклики національній безпеці. У результаті не було змоги належним чином 
оцінити наслідки політичних рішень, що приймались у сфері національної безпеки. 
У статті досліджуються походження, зміст і політична значущість доктрини національ-
ної безпеки для формування відповідного законодавства у сфері безпеки і оборони України.
Ключові слова: національна безпека; стратегія; парадигма, національний інтерес; загрози; 
виклики; збройна агресія; російсько-український конфлікт; Україна.
Problem setting. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as set in the 
Constitution Ukraine’s aspirations for membership in the EU and NATO, symbolizes 
the crisis of the old national security paradigm inherent its methodological settings, 
which were connected with the attitude of the previous stages of state-building. 
This crisis necessitates the development of a new paradigm for national security 
as a theoretical basis for the formation of a new National Security Strategy, which 
must overcome artificial barriers between internal and external security, defense 
and diplomacy, energy policy, migration and more. The renewal of the domestic 
paradigm requires analysis of foreign paradigms of both allies and opponents of 
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Ukraine; identifying threats and challenges to national security, both those that 
exist today and those that may arise in the future; defining ways to modernize 
national security components (economic, military, information, environmental, 
etc.). Changing the paradigm will lead to significant changes in the criteria that 
determine the direction of meaningful updating of the National Security Strategy, 
methods and ways of solving its tasks, which should provide for the following forms 
of deepening of cooperation of Ukraine with other subjects of international law in 
the fields of security and defense: strengthening of cooperation between Ukraine and 
the EU in the defense sphere in accordance with the Association Agreement; closer 
cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, in particular the acquisition of the status 
of the US main ally outside NATO; development and approval of the Concept of 
Foreign Policy of Ukraine; gaining EU and NATO membership.
Analysis of recent research and publications. Domestic scientists have been 
involved in the development of national security issues in Ukraine since 1991. 
These studies have been carried out mainly by philosophers, political scientists and 
specialists in public administration (V. Gorbulin [1], O. Vlasyuk [2], O. Danilian 
[3], O. Dzoban [4], Lipkan [5], O. Litvinenko [1], G. Novitsky [6] and others). 
Among the lawyers, these issues were raised in the works of employees of research 
institutes within the National Academy of Legal Sciences of Ukraine, in particular 
V. Pylypchuk [7] and V. Nastyuk [8]. Among the scientific works of domestic 
lawyers, most of the works are devoted to the research of particular components 
of national security (economic, environmental, information, etc.), while complex 
monographic studies of national security are almost never conducted. The attention 
of modern foreign authors is focused primarily on the problem of updating the 
paradigm and strategies of national security systems, the prospects of creating a 
European regional security system, the correlation of national systems with regional 
and international security systems, improving the collective security system (first 
of all within NATO).
Statement of the article objective. The purpose of the article is to find scientific 
approaches to updating the national paradigm of national security and formulating 
proposals for its reflection at the legislative level. This is not just about solving 
the current challenges of national security in the face of Russian aggression. The 
renewal of the national paradigm of national security must also take into account the 
need for tackling more global challenges. There is an assumption that in the future, 
globalization and regional integration will change the structure of national security 
of states. A global system of new challenges will increasingly require collective 
actions. Therefore, traditionally state-oriented approaches to security planning will 
be poorly adapted to such a burden. That is still the reason why states’ response 
to new threats should entail a change in the architecture of their national security 
institutions, taking into account that their ensuring will be achieved through joint 
action at both national, regional and international levels.
Presentation of the main body of the article. Since independence and until 
the midlle 1990s, Ukraine, due to its cultural and economic ties with Russia, was 
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perceived mainly through the «Russian prism» by the West. Many in Ukraine 
and abroad believed that Ukraine could not become a sovereign state or would 
be formally sovereign, but at the same time its foreign policy positions would be 
subordinated to the policies of Moscow [9, p. 448]. As a consequence, Ukraine 
was considered as a possible strategic partner of Russia [10]. As a result of such 
an attitude, Ukraine was paid limited attention by the West, and therefore a lack 
of resources allocated to it to overcome the difficulties of the transition period, 
especially in comparison with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Lacking serious support from the US and the European Union, Ukraine was forced 
to carefully choose its foreign policy vector. The passivity of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
was due primarily to the desire to get the balance between Russia and the West [9, 
p. 447]. Ukraine’s implementation of multi-vector policies with a focus on economic 
relations has led to accusations of the inability of the Ukrainian government to 
clearly define its foreign policy priorities.
The situation was complicated by the nuclear weapons factor: after the collapse 
of the USSR, a powerful nuclear arsenal remained in the territory of Ukraine, which 
it could not control (Kiev could only count on blocking missile launch without 
its consent). Under these conditions, nuclear disarmament was considered by the 
Government of Ukraine as a possible means of getting out of Moscow’s control and 
establishing relations with the West.
In the early 1990s, the United States and the West generally considered relations 
with Ukraine primarily through the lens of nuclear disarmament. American and 
European politicians did not understand Ukraine’s geopolitical value for European 
security ensuring. Thus Ukraine faced with the agreed Russian-US stance on nuclear 
disarmament [11].
Foreign politics exchange began in the mid-1990s, when Ukraine found itself 
between two military-political structures: NATO and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). Both organizations sought to include Ukraine in their orbit. 
It caused a problem of choice: either to adhere to one of the military structures, or to 
maintain non-aligned status in accordance with the Declaration of State Sovereignty. 
The nature of the international system (unipolar, bipolar or multipolar) is a critical 
factor affecting the foreign policy of states [12, p. 445]. In the conditions of 1990s, 
when the US-led unipolar model was adopted, Ukraine opted for NATO cooperation.
In 1993, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a Decree «On the Basic 
Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy» [13], stating that, given the geopolitical 
position of Ukraine, its declared intention to become a neutral and non-aligned state 
should be adapted to new conditions and cannot be an obstacle for its participation 
in the pan-European security structure. The inclusion of NATO in the concept of 
a «pan-European security structure» was an example of a broad interpretation of 
this category: the Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on Relations 
and Cooperation of Ukraine with NATO stated that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization serves as the heart of new pan-European security architecture [14]. At 
the same time, the ideas of the President of Poland L. Valesa on the creation of the 
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European «NATO-Bis» security structures [15, pp. 113–124] and the President of 
Ukraine L. Kravchuk on the formation of the «Baltic-Black Sea Belt» [16, р. 160] 
have received no support from NATO and the EU.
After long and difficult negotiations, President L. Kravchuk, in view of the 
threat of international isolation of Ukraine, signed a joint statement on January 
14, 1994 in Moscow with the Presidents of the United States and the Russian 
Federation «On the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the Territory of Ukraine». 
The Statement set out Ukraine’s international commitments to obtain non-nuclear 
status. This made it possible to withdraw Ukraine from international isolation and 
further intensify its relations with NATO.
In 1994, Ukraine was the first of the former USSR republics to join NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program. The Charter of Special Partnership between Ukraine 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1997) became the legal basis for 
Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO. Although the Charter did not contain provisions 
on the prospects for Ukraine’s NATO membership, such cooperation was considered 
by the Ukrainian government as an effective guarantee of its sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national security.
Adaptation of Ukraine’s foreign policy to new conditions was difficult and 
inconsistent. The process of adopting the general concept of Ukraine’s foreign policy 
was slowed down; The Verkhovna Rada limited itself by adopting separate laws, in 
particular the Law on the Basics of Ukraine’s National Security, which specified its 
relations with the European Union and NATO. However, the question of developing 
a national security doctrine was not raised at all.
The national security doctrine is a basic document for planning the development 
of the national security system of developed countries, which is based on a specific 
paradigm. Due to the formation of the national security doctrine, the activity of 
the state in the field of security ceases to be haphazard and fragmented. National 
security policy is implemented in accordance with the strategy, as a specially 
designed official document, which is based on the national security doctrine (a set 
of interconnected ideas in the field of tendencies management, real and predicted, 
to protect the permanent interests of society and the state). The development of the 
national security strategy takes into account the diplomatic, economic, demographic, 
scientific, technical and military potential of the state [17, pp. 4–5].
The abscence of a national security doctrine is partly explained by the fact that 
since Ukraine’s independence, no clear national security paradigm has emerged as a 
set of methods and principles for security policy research; scientific substantiation 
of national priorities; philosophical and worldview approaches to national security 
[18]. Among the scientific studies on national security, only about the paradigm of 
national economic security before the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict 
could be found separate articles [19]. But they were mostly devoted to stating the 
problem rather than revealing its contents.
The government began to develop the National Security Strategy only in 2007 
[20]. Significantly, the Russian-Georgian conflict did not cause the revision of the 
Getman A. P., Yakoviyk I. V. National security strategy of Ukraine: history of belated reforms 
13ISSN 2414-990X. Problems of legality. 2019. Issue 147
Strategy. In June 2012, a new version of the National Security Strategy «Ukraine in 
a Changing World» was adopted [21], which rightly stated that the 2007 Strategy 
did not become a guiding document for the practical activity of public authorities; 
there was a neglect of the needs of strategic development of society and the state, 
as a result of which increased threats to national security, weakened the ability of 
Ukraine to protect its national interests. Among the threats to the national interests 
and national security of Ukraine were quite right mentioned: the escalation of 
conflicts in the Black Sea-Caspian region; increased militarization of the region; the 
unresolved issue of the demarcation of the line of the state border of the Black Sea 
and the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait, abscence of demarcation of Ukraine-Russia 
state border; the presence of unresolved issues related to the temporary presence 
of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia in the territory of Ukraine. The interpretation of 
these threats gave reasons to recognize that Russia’s policy poses a certain threat 
to Ukraine’s national security or at least poses a challenge to its national interests. 
Nevertheless, the Strategy ignored the issue of potential adversaries. Moreover, 
adhering to the principle of multi-vectoring in foreign policy, the Ukrainian 
authorities highlighted the deepening of the strategic partnership with the European 
Union, Russia, the USA and China as one of the main tasks of the national security 
policy in the foreign policy sphere, as well as sought to develop common with 
Moscow approaches in formulating a new pan-European collective security system. 
The authors of the Strategy ignored the fact that the implementation of the latter 
objective was contrary to Ukraine’s intention to integrate into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic security structures.
On March 12, 2013, the National Security and Defense Council adopted a 
decision «On urgent measures for European integration of Ukraine» [22]. Thus, 
Ukraine preferred relations with the EU over relations with the Customs Union. 
However, on November 21, 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a Decree No. 905-r 
«Question on the Association Agreement between Ukraine, on the one hand, and 
the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member 
States, on another» [23]. The adoption of this Decree meant another correction 
of Ukraine’s foreign policy: the signing of the Association Agreement between the 
European Union and Ukraine, which was scheduled for November 28, was thwarted.
The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 905-r was canceled after the 
Revolution of Dignity by the new decree of the Government of Ukraine dated 
March 2, 2014 No. 113-r. [24]. This meant that Ukraine’s main foreign policy 
priority was once again joining the EU and NATO, which was achieved through the 
signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in 2014. The 
Association Agreement has been fully implemented since 1 September 2017.
In the conditions of aggravation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, on May 26, 
2015, the President of Ukraine approved by his decree the Strategy of Sustainable 
Development «Ukraine 2020» [25] and subsequently implemented the decision of 
the National Security and Defense Council «On the National Security Strategy of 
Ukraine» [26] (in 2015, the US and Russia updated their own National Security 
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Strategies). The adoption of the new version of the Strategy should have shown 
that the security situation for Ukraine has changed dramatically, which necessitates 
a change in approaches to its provision. Subsequently, in June 2018, a new Law on 
National Security of Ukraine was adopted [27], the main innovation of which was 
the introduction of civil control.
The action of both Strategies was calculated for the period up to 2020. The main 
directions of the national security policy were: renewing the territorial integrity of 
the state, creation of an effective security and defense sector, encreasing the defense 
capability, reforming and development of intelligence, counterintelligence and 
law enforcement agencies, provision of special NATO partnership, ensuring of the 
national security in foreign policy. Assessing the results of the implementation of the 
Strategies on the eve of the expiration of their validity, it should be acknowledged 
that the main task - the renewing of the territorial integrity of Ukraine has not 
been achieved, and the approaches to the implementation of other areas of national 
security policy have changed after the victory in the election of President of Ukraine 
V. Zelenskyi. It should be noted that the renewal of the national security legislation 
both during the presidency of P. Poroshenko and V. Zelenskyi occurs spontaneously. 
For example, in October, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine submitted to 
the President a new version of the Law «On Security Service of Ukraine». Members 
of the relevant parliamentary committees, ambassadors of the G-7 countries, heads 
of the EU Delegation in Ukraine and the NATO Delegation in Ukraine, the EU 
Advisory Mission on Civil Sector Reform also viewed the project. Subsequently, the 
draft law was transmitted to the National Security and Defense Council and the 
National Institute for Strategic Studies, which concludes that the document was 
developed without relying on national security doctrine.
As evidenced by world experience, the development of a national security 
doctrine and the subsequent adoption of a National Security Strategy, which defines 
a system of official views on the place and role of the state in the modern world, 
its vital national values, forces, means and methods of counteracting threats, is of a 
crucial importance for ensuring the sovereignty of the state, because according to 
its provisions is developing:
a) doctrines, strategies, separate concepts of individual areas of national security;
b) laws of Ukraine, the norms of which regulate relations on the implementation 
of the relevant component of national security;
c) programs that detail the activities of national security entities in a particular 
conditions.
The analysis of national security strategies (doctrines, concepts) of the leading 
countries of the world leads to the conclusion that the doctrinal vision of national 
security implies the separation of a number of structural elements [28]:
1. Fundamental national interests. They directly affect the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the state, and are therefore a condition for the existence of 
the state as an independent and self-sufficient subject of international law. National 
interests in the foreign policy sphere were defined in 1993 in the Verkhovna Rada 
Getman A. P., Yakoviyk I. V. National security strategy of Ukraine: history of belated reforms 
15ISSN 2414-990X. Problems of legality. 2019. Issue 147
Resolution «On the Main Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine» (expired in 
2010).
There have always been problems in defining a hierarchy of national interests in 
Ukraine, despite the fact that their allocation is necessary for ensuring high efficiency 
of state policy. Only in 2003 the priorities of national interests were specified in Art. 
6 of the Law «On Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine». But at the same 
time, the developed hierarchy of national security priorities ignored the fact that 
Ukraine is an independent and self-sufficient subject of international relations, not 
an appendage to some external center [29, p. 81]. The mistakes made by the political 
leadership of the state in the process of defining the hierarchy of national interests 
led to objections at the level of the Military Doctrine of the 1993 and 2004 model 
doctrines the possibility of a large-scale conflict in Central and Eastern Europe. 
And tit was despite the fact that in the mentioned period, the political leadership of 
both Russia and the US stated only a decrease in the probability of its appearence, 
but not its exclusion.
In today’s conditions, the priorities of national interests have not been revised 
in comparison with item 11 of Art. 3 of the Law «On the Fundamentals of National 
Security of Ukraine» 2003 («integration of Ukraine into the European political, 
economic, security, legal space, membership in the European Union and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, development of equal mutually beneficial relations 
with other states») [30] and the Strategy of the Integration of Ukraine into the 
European Union 1998 (expired in 2015), which stated in its preamble: «Ukraine’s 
national interests need to establish Ukraine as a powerful European state, fully-
fledged member of the EU» [31], but only acquired the imperative fixing at the level 
of the Constitution: «the implementation of the strategic course of the state for the 
acquisition of full Ukraine membership in the European Union and in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization» [32].
2. List of potential opponents (enemies) of the state. In the modern world, as 
such enemies are traditionally recognized: separate states or their unions; military-
political, religious, separatist, extremist, and other (drug cartels, illegal weapons 
and human trafficking organizations, pirates, cybercrime (hackers), etc.) groups or 
individuals. This list is set as complete and detailed as possible in the US National 
Security Strategy [33]. The list of opponents also contains programs (strategies) of 
Japan and Russia [34; 35]. Ukraine has traditionally not personified at the level of 
the Strategy its enemies [20; 21]. In the new National Security Strategy, Ukraine 
departed from this rule, recognizing aggressive actions by Russia as the main threat 
for national security [26].
In recent decades, there has been a shift towards collective defense and 
multilateral national security measures in many regions of the world. The desire to 
avoid inter-state conflicts and the enormous cost of defense spendings contribute to 
the strengthening of joint defense activities, international military cooperation and 
coordination. This tendency is also evident in Ukraine, which although joined the 
European integration process and established a special partnership relations with 
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NATO. In the end, due to the inconsistency of the state leadership in the choice of 
foreign policy vector (Ukraine recognized both its strategic partners at the same 
time both the USA and Russia, despite the fact that in some key issues the latter had 
diametrically opposite interests [36, p. 67], creating by that significant inconvenience 
for its strategic partners, that is why they regarded it as the most unknown in their 
long-term forecasts [37, p. 71]), it was useless to expect positive results.
3. Identification of potential threats to the state. Universal to all countries is 
the military threat and terrorism. At the same time, in modern conditions there is a 
diversification of security threats, an increasing of non-military threats, which leads 
to the transformation of the security structure.
It should be noted that the approaches to identifying threats to the state 
outlined in the 2015 Strategy are significantly different from the approaches 
embodied in the 2007 and 2012 Strategies. Thus, in the previous editions of the 
Strategy, among the goals of the implementation of the Strategy, the protection of 
the interests of the state took the last place, giving way to the creation of favorable 
conditions for ensuring the interests of citizens and society. The main threats 
to national security were considered to be internal ones. These are: insufficient 
efficiency of state power; threats to economic security; threats to energy security; 
insufficient level of scientific- technological development; socio-demographic crisis; 
the presence of dangerous environmental and man-made challenges and threats, etc. 
Accordingly, external threats were perceived as secondary, rather potential, than 
real. At the same time, they posed a threat to global international stability, while 
Ukraine’s security sphere was only adversely affected. This approach to the vision of 
threats was not only enshrined in the Strategy – it was also supported by experts, 
who considered the threat to territorial integrity to be illusory, thus conflicting 
issues with some countries regarding the demarcation of borders, economic zones, 
shelfs should be «taken more quietly, building relations with the foreign environment 
in a more positive way» [38–39].
In 2006, in a survey of alternative models of ensuring national security 
of Ukraine, less than half of the experts considered that there was a threat of 
annexation of part of the territory of Ukraine by another state; escalation of internal 
contradictions into open conflicts with the use of force [40, p. 42]. And although 
in 2008 Ukrainian and foreign experts within the NATO-Ukraine Partnership 
Network noted that in the conditions of the birth of the multipolar world (after 
the Russian-Georgian conflict) and the formation of a new center of influence - 
the Russian Federation – along the borders of Ukraine, external threats should 
include: the growing aggressiveness of Russia’s policies aimed at expanding areas 
of influence in the post-Soviet space with the possible use of force against its 
neighbors; weakening the effectiveness of international law and the effectiveness 
of international institutions and, accordingly, reducing Ukraine’s external security 
guarantees; aggravation of the situation in the zones of «frozen» conflicts and 
attempts of external intervention in order to create new conflict zones as a means 
of interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states, including Ukraine [41–42], 
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this did not lead to a review of Ukraine’s national security threats at the Strategy 
level [43, p. 3–22].
This fact is explained first of all by the fact that in accordance with the 
Verkhovna Rada Resolution «On the Main Directions of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy», 
each border state was recognized as a strategic partner of Ukraine [44]. Under 
these conditions, there is an unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region of the 
Republic of Moldova; the unresolved issue of the demarcation of the Black Sea and 
Azov Sea waters and the Kerch Strait, the absence of demarcation of the Ukrainian 
state border with the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic 
of Moldova; the presence of unresolved issues related to the temporary presence of 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Ukraine, the imperfection of the legal 
basis in this sphere, all that were considered not as threats, but as external challenges 
to the national security of Ukraine.
It should be noted that Ukraine’s position on identifying external threats to 
national security, as well as identifying strategic partners, was to a certain extent 
driven by geopolitical considerations, as well as by key players in the international 
arena, in particular the United States. Thus, in 2000, in the process of discussion 
within the framework of the National Security Program of Ukraine, proposed by the 
School of State Administration of John Kennedy Harvard University’s, Sh. Garnett, 
has suggested an idea supported many western experts that Russia is stronger than 
any of its neighbors in the post-Soviet space, but in fact it is so weak that it cannot 
affect several post-Soviet states at the same time so it isn’t able to influence them for 
a long time because of it’s inability to maintain their strategic power [45, p. 16]. Due 
to the contradiction between strategic understanding and strategic misinformation 
about what was happening in the CIS, many western experts believed that, first, 
Ukraine should not be a NATO member, since Russia would consider it as a hostile 
act and, second, it must cooperate with Russia. Ukraine, as a secondary regional 
state, which is a partner of the United States in ensuring an effective balance of 
power in Eurasia, was tasked with hindering Russia’s enlargement process and it’s 
returning to superpower status [46, p. 10]. It is significant that during this period 
Ukraine did not expect the final choice of the vector of its development should 
appear in about 10 years. At the same time Z. Brzezinski said on this occasion 
that this choice would be difficult for the political elite who used to «sit on two 
chairs». As a consequence, such a decision may, as a last resort, involve the military 
forces, which is the «state institute that can do (and probable have to do) what the 
military in Turkey and Brazil did at one time» [47, p. 15]. It should be admitted that 
Z. Brzezinski was mistaken only in the choice of the subject, since it was not the 
army and special services that became the driving force in the events of February 
2014, which led to the removal from power of V. Yanukovych and his team and, 
consequently, to the change of the foreign policy development vector of the state, 
which led to revision of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine.
In the National Security Strategy of Ukraine 2015, the interests of the state 
became a priority. The Strategy introduces a division into external and internal 
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threats, as well as a certain hierarchy of threats, among which special emphasis is 
placed on Russia’s aggressive actions (external threat), which are treated broadly: 
military aggression, occupation of territory, trade and economic war, information 
and psychological war. The recognition of the possibility of using military force as a 
major threat is explained by the fact that confrontation with Russia is considered as 
a long-term factor of Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy. As a consequence, the 
other threats that are attributed to the internal block are derived from it. Developers 
of the Stratgy incuded to Internal threats: inefficiency of the national security and 
defense system; corruption and inefficient state administration system; economic 
crisis, depletion of financial resources of the state, reduction of living standards of 
the population; threats to energy security; threats to information security; threats to 
cybersecurity and security of information resources; threats to environmental safety; 
threats to the security of critical infrastructure.
4. Certain target units that are developed and implemented by the higher 
authorities, empowered to develop national security policies, as well as other subjects 
(both state and non-state) of national security.
Some countries that position themselves as global or regional leaders (at present 
they are the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, China) also recognize the 
mission of the state at a particular historical stage (it is still the doctrine reflecting 
national interests in their specific understanding by the higher authorities) [48]. 
The realization of such a mission is not only rational in nature – one of the goals of 
its realization is glory, which is the recognition of one’s superiority by other nations 
[49, p. 38].
It should be noted that the state has a key role in national security ensuring. 
However, it should not be forgotten that national security is a matter of the whole 
society, not just of the state, which is really only an instrument (albeit a fundamental 
one) in its hands [50, p. 245]. This provision follows from Art. 17 of the Constitution 
[51], which states that the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine, ensuring its economical and informational security is also a matter of the 
entire Ukrainian people (as well as from the norms of the laws of Ukraine) [52]. 
Therefore, the mechanism of ensuring the national security of Ukraine requires 
the active participation of both state institutions and civil society structures, 
interconnected by common tasks being solved by their inherent methods, forces 
and means.
Conclusions. Summarizing all of the abovementioned, it is necessary to point 
out the following conclusions.
The strategic goals of Ukraine’s foreign policy include: European and Euro-
Atlantic integration; strategic partnerships with the United States of America 
and the European Union; active engagement with the UN and other international 
organizations. Ukraine has named EU membership and NATO membership as top 
priorities. Which of those two seems more important for Ukraine? Admittedly, 
Ukraine’s current interests are not about returning to non-aligned politics and 
not about trying to achieve NATO membership (it is not realistic today). Ukraine 
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should initiate the introduction of a collective security mechanism at the pan-
European level, in which an immediate and tangible set of punitive sanctions must 
be used against the offender. Regarding the priority of EU or NATO membership, 
determining which organization is more important for ensuring Ukraine’s national 
security. There is no competition between the European and Euro-Atlantic 
dimensions of Ukraine’s strategic course towards Europe. The NATO-Ukraine 
Distinctive Partnership is an inalienable part of Ukraine’s strategic course towards 
EU membership. The Ukraine, NATO and the EU work together actively on solving 
a problem of ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national 
security, as well as its maintenance of peace and stability in in the commin Euro-
Atlantic home. A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine is the key to Euro-
Atlantic security. Priority is being given to supporting a comprehensive reform of 
the security and defense area of Ukraine, which is vital for enhancing its ability to 
defend itself.
Security and Defense Sector reforming in Ukraine is a long-term process looking 
to deliver long-term results. In 2015–2019, Ukraine has undertaken in-depth 
structural reforms in some key sectors of security and defense. Today the Ukrainian 
army is able to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. However, 
together with NATO and the EU, Ukraine can perform it more effectively in the 
defense of the eastern flank of Europe. So Ukraine can contribute to NATO’s 
collective security.
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Стратегия национальной безопасности Украины: история запоздалых реформ
Среди научных вопросов, стоящих перед украинским юридическим сообществом на современ-
ном этапе, особенно актуальными и практически значимыми являются проблемы в сфере права 
национальной безопасности. Это обусловлено прежде всего необходимостью системного рефор-
мирования сектора безопасности и обороны Украины, которое осуществляется для обеспечения 
защиты конституционного строя, суверенитета, территориальной целостности Украины в усло-
виях вооруженной агрессии. Исследования в этой сфере не должны ограничиваться отдельными 
предметными направлениями в разработке и решении комплексных проблем, в частности права 
национальной безопасности. С момента обретения независимости систематического оценивания 
прямого или косвенного влияния доктрины национальной безопасности на правовое регулирование 
сферы безопасности в Украине не проводилось. В результате игнорирования вопросов определе-
ния потенциальных противников Украины и угроз, которые от них исходят, власть в процессе 
формирования политики безопасности руководствовалась в основном субъективными факторами, 
игнорируя существующие и потенциальные вызовы национальной безопасности. В результате не 
было возможности должным образом оценить последствия политических решений, которые при-
нимались в сфере национальной безопасности. 
В статье исследуются происхождение, содержание и политическая значимость доктрины 
национальной безопасности для формирования соответствующего законодательства в сфере без-
опасности и обороны Украины.
Ключевые слова: национальная безопасность; стратегия, парадигма; национальный инте-
рес; угрозы; вызовы; вооруженная агрессия; российско-украинский конфликт; Украина.
Рекомендоване цитування: Getman A. P., Yakoviyk I. V. National security strategy of 
Ukraine: history of belated reforms. Проблеми законності. 2019. Вип. 147. С. 8–22. doi: https://doi.
org/10.21564/2414-990x.147.186338.
Suggested Citation: Getman, A.P., Yakoviyk, I.V. (2019). National security strategy of Ukraine: 
history of belated reforms. Problemy zakonnosti – Problems of Legality, issue 147, 8–22. doi: https://
doi.org/10.21564/2414-990x.147.186338.
Надійшла до редколегії 31.10.2019 р.
